analysed by reference to notes for lectures Hilbert gave during that period in Gottingen. It is this progression I want to depict. But before doing that in parts 2 through 4,1 recall very briefly some pertinent context, l. BACKGROUND. Hilbert viewed the axiomatic method as holding the key to a systematic organization of any sufficiently developed subject; he also saw it as providing the basis for metamathematical investigations of independence and completeness issues and for philosophical reflections. However, consistency was Hilbert's central concern ever since he turned his attention to the foundations of analysis in the late nineties of the last century. These 19-th century roots of Hilbert's work are very important and reveal the major intellectual forces that led Hilbert to the initial formulation of a syntactic consistency program in 1904/5. 5 As to the period from 1905 to 1917, I emphasize that Hilbert gave lecture courses on the foundations of mathematics almost every single year. We have notes for most of them; some are written out meticulously, for example by Max Born and Richard Courant. These lectures do not break new ground, in particular, they do not push along the "proof theoretic" approach of Hilbert's 1905 paper (that was so severely, yet fairly criticized by Poincare in 1905/6). On the contrary, the notes for his Set Theory course in the summer term of 1917 and the almost contemporaneous paper Axiomatisches Denken reveal a logicist direction in Hilbert's work. In the notes Hilbert gives an axiom system for natural numbers and remarks that this is only a first step for his foundational investigation:
... if we set up the axioms of arithmetic, but forego their further reduction and take over uncritically the usual laws of logic, then we have to realize that we have not overcome die difficulties for a first philosophical-epistemological foundation; rattier, we have just cut them off in this way.
In the essay Axiomatisches Denken he presses the issues further; viewing the examination of consistency as an "unavoidable task" he remarks:
... thus, it seems to be necessary to axiomatize logic itself and to show that number theory as well as set theory are just parts of logic. This avenue, prepared for a long time, not least by the deep investigations of Frege, has finally been taken most successfully by the penetrating mathematician and logician Russell. The completion of this broad Russellian enterprise of axiomatizmg logic might be viewed quite simply as the crowning achievement of the work of axiomatization.
5 Let me mention stenographkally: Dedekind, consistency concerns ar*i seK ronecker, emphasis on a thoroughly constructive approach; Cantor, letters to Hilbert communicating the inconsistency of Dedekind's framework (1897); Hilbert, from semantic argument to syntactic approach (1900; 1904/5). These connections are discussed in my papers (1990) and (1997A). 1904/5). These connections are discussed in my papers (1990) and (1997A).
At the end of the set theory notes Hilbert emphasizes that, if we try to achieve such a reduction to logic, we are facing one of the most difficult problems of mathematics; he continues:
Poincare has even the view that this is not at all possible. But with that view one could rest content only if it had been proved that the further reduction of the axioms for arithmetic is impossible; but that is not the case. Next term I hope to be able to examine more closely a foundation for logic.
One has the sense that the exigencies of academic life and the complexity of the issues diverted Hilbert's attention to his own great dissatisfaction. That motivated, I assume, Hilbert The first four chapters lead, in part, to a systematic formulation of first order logic; every step taken in expanding the logical framework is semantically motivated and carefully argued for. This material was novel at the time; by now it is all too familiar and will not be discussed except to note and emphasize one important difference: the languages contain sentential and function (i.e., relation) variables. The last chapter takes a noteworthy turn. If only a formalization of logical reasoning were aimed for, no additional work beyond that of the earlier chapters would be needed. However, the logical calculus is to play an important role for the investigation of mathematical theories and their relation to logic:
Not only do we want to develop individual theories from their principles in a purely formal way, but we also want to investigate the foundations of the mathematical theories and examine, what their relation to logic is and how far they can be built up from purely logical operations and concepts; and for this purpose the logical calculus is to serve as an auxiliary tool.
Detailed reflection leads "in the most natural way" to ramified type theory together with Russell's axiom of reducibility; this framework is then used for the development of analysis. The notes end with the remark:
Thus it is clear that the introduction of the axiom of reducibility is the appropriate means to turn the ramified calculus into a system out of which the foundations for higher mathematics can be developed.
7
The notes present more than a system for the development of parts of higher mathematics. They constitute literally the first text presenting the core of modern logic with its distinctive metamathematical turn: the careful presentation of syntax and semantics provides the basis for the investigation of completeness and consistency issues, as they are now standardly examined in any first introduction to mathematical logic. most dearly themes that are found in the literature, with equally good sense and balance, only paper on "Russell's Mathematical Logic".
The formal frame I have been discussing is not only contentually motivated, but its semantics is properly specified and the central semantic notions are carefully formulated. First order theories are always viewed together with suitable non-empty domains, Bereiche, indicating the range of the individual variables of the theory and the interpretations of the nonlogical vocabulary (except, for sure, the sentential and function variables). In modern terms, they are always presented together with a structure. How are expressions of the formal language to be understood, given the associated domain? After the discussion of the axiom system for the function calculus there is the following remark clarifying where a semantic understanding is needed and where pure formality is essential:
This system of axioms provides us with a procedure to carry out logical proofs strictly formally, i.e., in such a way that we need not be concerned with the meaning of the judgements that are represented by formulas, rather we just have to attend to the prescriptions contained in the rules. However, we have to interpret the signs of our calculus when representing symbolically the premises from which we start and when understanding the results obtained by formal operations.
The logical signs are interpreted ... corresponding to the given linguistic reading; and the occurrence of indeterminate statement-signs and function-signs in a formula is to be understood as follows: for arbitrary replacements by determinate statements and functions the claim that results from the formula is correct.
The underlying concept of correctness, Richtigkeit, with respect to a domain is understood as follows: (1) statements involving no sentential or function variables are "correct" if they are true in the domain (and that is informally taken in exactly the same way as in the model theoretic arguments for independence and relative consistency in Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie and in Godel's 1929 dissertation); (2) if a statement does contain such variables, then the clause "for arbitrary replacements ..." is invoked to define "correctness" for this broader class of statements. Having clarified the basic semantics, I turn to completeness.
For die very purpose of the calculus in the systematic investigation it is crucial that the ordinary forms of logical argumentation can be recaptured formally. This is clearly expressed in the 1917/18 lecture notes 8 :
As for any other axiomatic system, one can raise also for this system the questions concerning consistency, logical dependencies, and completeness. The most important question is here that concerning completeness. After all, the goal of symbolic logic is to develop ordinary logic from the formalized assumptions. Thus it is essential to show that our axiom system suffices for the development of ordinary logic.
8 Such metamathematkal concerns for logk are found already in the very eariy notes, e.g., of 1905.
The notes contain prominently only one precise concept of completeness for logical calculi, namely what has come to be known as Post-completeness: a calculus is Post-complete just in case "the addition of a formula, hitherto improvable, to the system of basic formulas always leads to an inconsistent system". That is quickly established for sentential logic; in a footnote 9 the semantic completeness is proved. The latter notion is brought to the fore in In intuitive number theory the general sentences have a purely hypothetical sense. A sentence like a+b = b+a only means: given two numerals a, b, the additive composition of a with b yields the same numeral as the additive composition of b with a. There is no mention of the totality of all numbers. Furthermore, the existential sentences have in intuitive number theory only the meaning of partial-judgements, i.e., they are substatements of more precisely determined statements whose precise content, however, is inessential for many applications. ... thus, in general, a more detailed sentence complements in intuitive number theory an existential judgement; the sentence determines more precisely the content of that judgement. The existential claim here has sense only as a pointer to a search procedure which one possesses, but that ordinarily need not be elaborated, because it suffices generally to know that one has it. This is exactly the understanding formulated in 1925 in Uber das Unendliche and, most extensively, in 1934 in the first volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik; it is also strikingly similar to Weyl's viewpoint in (1921) .
14 With this understanding of quantifiers the conclusion concerning the non-validity of the law of the excluded middle is obtained again. Hilbert writes (in the 1921/22 notes):
Thus we see that, for a strict foundation of mathematics, the usual inference methods of analysis must not be taken as logically trivial. Rather it is exactly the task for the foundational investigation to recognize, why it is that the application of transfinite inference methods as used in analysis and axiomatic set theory leads always to correct results.
As that recognition has to be obtained on the basis of finitist logic, Hilbert argues, we have to extend our considerations in a different direction in order to go beyond elementary number theory:
We have to extend the domain of objects to be considered; i.e., we have to apply our intuitive considerations also to figures that are not number signs. Thus we have good reason to distance ourselves from the earlier dominant principle according to which each theorem of pure mathematics is in the end a statement concerning integers. This principle was viewed as expressing a fundamental methodological insight, but it has to be given up as a prejudice. objects, it is clear that the formulas and proofs from formal theories have to be included; as to the methodological requirements, Hilbert remarks:
This is a strong statement against a tradition that started with
... the figures we take as objects must be completely surveyable and only discrete determinations are to be considered for them. It is only under these conditions that our claims and considerations have the same reliability and evidence as in intuitive number theory.
From this new standpoint Hilbert exploits the formalizability of a fragment of number theory in full first order logic to formulate and prove its consistency. Here we finally close the gap to the published record -with a fully developed programmatic perspective.
The dialectic of the developments that emerges from these lectures given between 1917 and 1922 is reflected in Bernays paper of 1922. Bernays' analysis brings out clearly the "Ansatzcharakter" of the proposed solution: in order to provide a rigorous foundation for arithmetic (that includes analysis and set theory) one proceeds axiomatically and starts out with the assumption of a system of objects satisfying certain structural conditions. However, in the assumption of such a system "lies something so-to-speak transcendental for mathematics, and the question arises, which principled position is to be taken The expanding development of proof theory is one effect of Hilbert's broad view on foundational problems and of his sharply articulated questions. Another effect is plainly visible in the rich and varied contributions that were given to us by Hilbert, Bernays, and other members of the Hilbert School (Ackermann, von Neumann, Gentzen, Schiitte); finally, we have to consider also the stimulus his approach and questions provided to contemporaries outside the school (Herbrand, Godel, Church, Turing and, much earlier already, Zermelo). Indeed, there is no foundational enterprise with a more profound and far-reaching effect on the emergence and development of mathematical logic. If we were open, it could have a similar effect on philosophical reflections on mathematical experience and help us gain a perspective that includes traditional concerns, but that allows us to ask questions transcending traditional boundaries.
Let me discuss briefly one such question. If we take the expansion of the domain of objects for finitist considerations seriously, we are dealing not just with numerals, but more generally with elements of inductively generated classes. (The generation is to be elementary and deterministic, in modern terminology.) A related point was already made by Poincare, when he emphasized after discussing the principle of induction for natural numbers:
I did not mean to say, as has been supposed, that all mathematical reasonings can be reduced to an application of this principle. Examining these reasonings closely, we there should see applied many other analogous principles, presenting the same essential characteristics. In this category of principles, that of complete induction is only the simplest of all and this is why I have chosen it as a type." (p. 1025) Godel, following Poincare and Hilbert, believed also that the method of complete induction has a "particularly high degree of evidence". But what is the nature of this evidence? In spite of important work that has been done for elementary number theory, this is still a significant question and should be addressed in greater generality. The assumption that work for elementary number theory covers all the bases, because of a simple effective Godel numbering, prevents us from articulating the evidential features of inductively generated objects in a general way. That suggests two directions for interesting work.
First, there is ample room to improve our understanding of Hilberf s and Bernays' views on the matter. For example, I take it that Godel's attempt to characterize the finitist standpoint in his 1958 paper is in conflict with their views and with his own earlier informal description of the central features of finitist mathematics. At issue is whether the insights needed to carry out proofs concerning finitist objects spring purely from the combinatorial (spatiotemporal) properties of the sign combinations that represent them, or whether an element of "reflection" is needed, reflection that takes into account the uniform generation of the objects. The latter is explicitly affirmed in (Bernays 1930) and, by my lights, implicit in Hilbert's description of the "extra-logical concrete objects" that are needed to secure meaningful logical reasoning: such objects must not only be surveyable, but the fact that they follow each other, in particular, is immediately given intuitively together with the objects and cannot be further reduced. 
